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The Requirements File Was Clean. The Git Hook Was the Trap.

A fake take-home interview hid its downloader in Git metadata, which is why I now treat unfamiliar project archives as untrusted before the first editor or Git action.

Appaji C.July 24, 20265 min read

CybersecurityDeveloper ToolsGitJob ScamsMalware

Reported facts

The report begins with an unsolicited LinkedIn pitch for Python work.
The offer promised $10,000 to $15,000 per month for remote work.
The claimed company was a Y Combinator startup, adding credibility.
A polished PDF and project archive followed through Google Drive.
The visible backend and dependency list looked ordinary at first.
I treat that polish as packaging, not permission.
The offer looked plausible
Appaji C. reports that an unsolicited recruiter offered a remote Python role paying $10,000 to $15,000 per month. The claimed employer was a Y Combinator startup, and the take-home arrived as a polished PDF plus a project archive on Google Drive. The speed bothers me: borrowed credibility can make an unfamiliar archive feel safer than it is.
Appaji C.: fake interview Git hook investigation
The requirements file showed no obvious malicious packages.
Listing hidden files exposed a bundled repository directory.
Its pre-commit hook downloaded code from a raw IP address.
The hook selected a payload for each host operating system.
A commit could start the download before application code ran.
The author concluded the Git tasks were meant to trigger hooks.
The trap lived below the code
The archive's visible FastAPI project and requirements file looked ordinary. A hidden-file listing revealed a bundled .git directory with many hooks, including a pre-commit script that chose a download command by operating system and fetched remote code. Git documents pre-commit as a hook invoked by git commit, which explains why an assignment containing Git tasks could provide the trigger.
Appaji C.: hook and payload analysis Git documentation: hooks
The first script saved and launched a second Linux payload.
That stage installed tooling and started an obfuscated parser.
Changing the request identifier returned a different script.
Suspicious dependencies hinted at theft, but did not prove it.
I can trace the downloads, but not the final objective.
Three open ports did not reveal who ran the server.
The downloader was clearer than the motive
The source directly observed a Linux script saving and launching a second payload, which then installed tooling and ran an obfuscated parser. Changing the request identifier produced a different script, suggesting per-target variation. The dependencies raised reasonable concern about credential or crypto theft, but the article did not prove the final objective or identify the operator. That is where I stop the claim.
Appaji C.: staged payload evidence Paradane: separate fake interview campaign analysis
Microsoft traces this campaign pattern to December 2022.
The lure works by copying a normal recruiting sequence.
Packages, Git hooks, and editor tasks can all become triggers.
This sample fits the pattern; its operator remains unproven.
Restricted Mode limits tasks, terminals, debugging, and agents.
I want the trust decision before any developer tool runs.
A known pattern, not a proven operator
Microsoft says the Contagious Interview campaign has operated since at least December 2022 and uses staged recruiting to persuade developers to run malicious packages or commands. That context makes this report plausible, but it does not prove who operated this particular server. VS Code's Restricted Mode matters because it limits tasks, terminals, debugging, workspace settings, extensions, and agents while an unfamiliar folder is reviewed.
Microsoft Security: Contagious Interview Visual Studio Code: Workspace Trust Appaji C.: reported sample
Open take-home projects in a disposable, isolated environment.
Inspect hidden directories before opening the project in an editor.
Review hooks, editor tasks, and package lifecycle scripts first.
Keep production credentials and long-lived tokens off that machine.
Run only after inspection, with network activity still monitored.
The assignment can wait; my workstation should not take the risk.
Move inspection ahead of trust
I now open recruiter-provided code only inside a disposable, isolated environment, then inspect hidden directories and likely execution surfaces before using an editor or running Git. Microsoft recommends non-persistent virtual machines for coding tests, keeping them away from production credentials, and monitoring suspicious command or network activity. A clean dependency file is only one check.
Microsoft Security: defensive recommendations Visual Studio Code: Restricted Mode Git documentation: pre-commit hook

License

Suggested attribution: Based on "The Requirements File Was Clean. The Git Hook Was the Trap." by Mark Huang, originally published at https://markhuang.ai/news/clean-requirements-git-hook-trap.

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